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1. Introduction
*
In most countries, public borrowing by subnational governments is subjected to some
restrictions imposed by the national governments. In a recent study of 53 selected
countries, researchers at the International Monetary Fund found that all but six countries
imposed such restrictions.
1  Public borrowing by subnational governments was altogether
prohibited in 16 countries, while 19 countries did not allow subnational governments to
borrow overseas. The controls in the remaining countries vary in detail and have been
classified by the authors of the IMF study into the broad categories of administrative
controls, rule-based controls and cooperative controls.
A common objective of controls on  subnational borrowing appears to be to
exercise restraint over the growth of public debt at the subnational level. The reasoning
behind the need for administrative controls is that if subnational governments were free
to raise public loans, they would borrow excessively, hence the need for externally
imposed fiscal discipline in the form of administrative controls. It is now recognized,
however, that a regime of administrative controls may perversely contribute to excessive
borrowing if subnational governments come to expect that in the event of debt servicing
difficulties they would be bailed out by the national government.
Following Kornai, who first argued in 1980 that managers would fail to observe
financial discipline if they expected their organization to be bailed out of financial
trouble,
2 many studies have explored the effects of organizational structures, including
fiscal federalism, on incentives, financial performance and fiscal discipline.
3 Since 1927,
the Australian Loan Council has been responsible for determining the overall level of
public borrowing in Australia, and state government borrowings could not be undertaken
without the approval of the Loan Council. The purpose of this paper is to examine the
effect of the Loan Council’s restrictions on the fiscal discipline of the states. In particular,
the paper examines whether, and to what extent, these restrictions might have resulted in
bailouts or otherwise contributed to the growth of soft budget constraints for the states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The background to the establishment
of the Loan Council, its composition, rules and procedures are outlined in Section 2.
Section 3 traces the experience of the Loan Council through six distinct phases and
focuses on four specific episodes that marked turning points in the Loan Council’s
evolution and which had important implications for budget constraints and incentives
facing state governments. A brief summary of the main conclusions is provided in
Section 4.
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2. Australian Loan Council
2.1 Establishment of the Australian Loan Council
Australia became a federation on 1 January 1901, when the six British colonies of
Australia adopted the Constitution of the Federal Commonwealth of Australia under
which the Commonwealth government was created as the national government of
Australia. The Constitution did not provide for coordination of public borrowing, and
until 1922 the Commonwealth and the States borrowed individually. A voluntary Loan
Council was formed in 1923 to avoid competition among governments for public loans.
Four years later, the Australian Loan Council was established formally in December
1927, when the representatives of governments of the six States and the Commonwealth
signed the Financial Agreement subject to subsequent ratification by their respective
Parliaments. The necessary legislation was passed by each of the Parliaments in 1928. As
there were doubts about the Constitutional validity of some parts of the Financial
Agreement, the preamble to the Agreement acknowledged that it could not be given
permanent effect until the Constitution had been appropriately amended. The insertion of
a new section, 105A, into the Commonwealth Constitution was approved at a referendum
held in November 1928. The referendum was approved in all States and received
endorsement from 74 per cent of all voters. According to one source:
The overwhelming support [for the referendum] undoubtedly
resulted from the enthusiastic assurance given to voters that that
the amendment would restrict future government borrowing and
pay off existing public debt. Most people in the [nineteen] twenties
had a phobia about public debt. A recurring newspaper cartoon of
the period depicted a newly-born Australian infant with a millstone
around his neck on which was inscribed the amount of the public
debt per head of population!
4
The Financial Agreement empowered the Commonwealth government to make
agreements with the States in respect of their public debt, including (a) the takeover of
such debt, (b) the management of such debt, and (c) the borrowing of money by the
States or by the Commonwealth for the States. The Australian Loan Council became the
sole Constitutional body with responsibility for determining the amounts, interest rates
and other terms and conditions of loan raisings on behalf of the Commonwealth and the
six States. Public borrowings for defense purposes and for temporary purposes, though,
could still be undertaken without the approval of the Loan Council.
5 Initially, borrowings
of local and semi-government authorities were also outside the Loan Council’s control.
When it became clear, however, that this exception might become a loophole for
avoiding the Loan Council’s discipline, the exception was removed in 1936 with the
passage of the so-called Gentlemen’s Agreement, which brought the exempted
borrowings under the purview of the Loan Council. During the late 1970s, the Loan
Council’s control over the borrowings of semi-government authorities was progressively
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relaxed until the Gentlemen’s Agreement was finally terminated in 1985, when the
distinction between borrowings of the State governments and their semi-government
authorities was removed under the new Global Limit Approach (see Section 3.5 below).
2.2 Composition and Procedures of the Loan Council
Formally, the Loan Council consists of the Prime Minister (or a Minister nominated by
him) and the Premier of each of the six States (or a Minister nominated by each Premier).
In practice, the Federal Treasurer represents the Commonwealth and chairs the Loan
Council meetings, even though the Prime Minister also attends most of the meetings.
Similarly, the State Treasurers represent their respective States at the Loan Council,
although some other State Ministers may also attend if required by the agenda of a certain
meeting.
The meetings of the Loan Council are always held in camera. No minutes of the
meetings are published and only formal resolutions passed at a meeting may be released
after the meeting. In principle, a meeting of the Loan Council may be called by the
Commonwealth or by any three States at any time. In practice, the Loan Council usually
meets at least once a year, at the same time as the Premiers’ Conference, due to the
common membership of the two bodies and the convenience of considering fiscal issues
that are often interrelated. Indeed, it is not uncommon for a meeting of the Premiers’
Conference to convert itself into the meeting of the Loan Council for considering a
certain issue and convert back into a meeting of the Premiers’ Conference to resume an
unfinished agenda. In spite of its importance in Australian federalism, there is no specific
place or building assigned to the Loan Council and it has no separate secretariat; the
Commonwealth Treasury provides the secretarial support for the Loan Council. In recent
years, the procedures of the Loan Council have been amended to consider and approve
certain resolutions informally through correspondence, which can be noted at a
subsequent formal meeting.
6      
Each State has one vote at the Loan Council, while the Commonwealth has two
votes and a casting vote. This means that, if necessary, the Commonwealth can impose its
will on the Loan Council with the support of no more than two States whereas five States
would need to combine to outvote the Commonwealth. It will be noted below that on
certain occasions the Commonwealth had to rely on its unequal voting power to impose
its decisions on the Loan Council.
In understanding the commitment of the States to the discipline of the Loan
Council it is important to recognize that the agreement between the States and the
Commonwealth in 1927 to establish the Loan Council was not an isolated initiative to
impose Commonwealth control over State borrowing. Instead, it was part of a broader
agreement that simultaneously addressed a number of outstanding issues of
intergovernmental financial relations at the time. Consequently, in complying with the
provisions of the Financial Agreement, both levels of government had more at stake than
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just the coordination of public borrowings.
7 In addition to the establishment of the Loan
Council, the Financial Agreement also provided for the following changes to
intergovernmental financial arrangements:
•  End of Commonwealth per capita grants to the States (in operation since 1909);
•  Commonwealth takeover of the existing debt of the States;
•  Commencement of State contributions to the National Debt Sinking Fund;
•  Commonwealth grants to the States to enable them to meet a part of their obligations
for interest on debt and contributions to the National Debt Sinking Fund; and
•  The States’ agreement to indemnify the Commonwealth for the difference between
the cost of the takeover of State debt and the new Commonwealth grants towards the
servicing of State debt.
In the context of potential bailouts and incentives for the States, the following
aspects of the new arrangements were particularly important:
•  All State loans would now be issued in the name of the Commonwealth;
•  The States were only partly responsible for meeting the cost of servicing their debt, as
the Commonwealth was also making contributions to the national Sinking fund on
their debt;
•  The States almost always needed to (at least sought to) borrow more than was on
offer in the capital markets at the price offered by the States; and
•  As the Commonwealth government was the borrower under the Loan Council
arrangements, the interest cost of borrowings was lower than it would be if the States
were borrowing in their own names.
2.3 The Functions of the Loan Council
The main purpose of the Loan Council is to coordinate domestic and overseas borrowings
of the States and the Commonwealth. This involves determining the total amount of
funds that may be borrowed in a particular year. Such determinations are made in the
light of submissions made by the seven governments regarding their respective needs for
borrowings, and on the advice of the Commonwealth Treasury and the Reserve Bank of
Australia
8 concerning macroeconomic conditions and the likely responses of the capital
markets. Generally, the States have sought to borrow more than what the Commonwealth
considered to be feasible and what the capital markets were prepared to lend at
reasonable rates of interest. Accordingly, the Loan Council has often found it necessary
to scale down the original demands made by the States for borrowings.
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The Loan Council’s next function is to allocate the aggregate borrowing for the
forthcoming financial year among the States. The procedures dictate that the Loan
Council must either approve an allocation unanimously or invoke the formula-based
allocation. In the event of the formula-based allocation is invoked, each State’s share of
the year’s total public borrowing would be equal to its share of the net loan expenditure
during the previous five years. Although the Loan Council has never invoked the
allocation formula, until recently its allocations each year have been aligned with each
State’s formula entitlements. It is common, however, for a State to voluntarily transfer a
part of its allocation to another State in a particular year.
The Loan Council is also responsible for determining the terms and conditions,
and the timing of the approved loan raisings. In practice, however, responsibility for
monetary policy confers on the Commonwealth government, again acting on the advice
of the Reserve Bank of Australia and Commonwealth Treasury, a decisive role in these
matters.
The objectives and priorities of the Loan Council have continued to change during
the past seventy years, and this has been reflected in the evolution of its rules and
procedures over this period. This evolution can be divided into six periods, each of which
represents a separate phase in the life of the Loan Council as an institution responsible for
the coordination of public sector borrowings in Australia.
3.  The Evolution of the Australian Loan Council
3.1. From Competition to Voluntary Coordination: 1901-1927
As noted above, all governments in Australia competed with one another between 1901
and 1922. Some voluntary coordination occurred in 1916 and 1917, when the
Commonwealth government raised loans in London on behalf of five States; New South
Wales raised its own loans. Competitive borrowing was resumed in 1918 and all
governments borrowed heavily in London in the following few years.
9 At the 1923
Premiers’ Conference, a voluntary Loan Council was formed, which would seek to
coordinate the timing, interest rates and other terms and conditions of public borrowings,
but which had no authority for determining the total amount of loan raisings or issuing
centralized securities. Both levels of government were under pressure for heavy
borrowing during this period: the Commonwealth for repaying its war debt and the States
for financing their capital programs, unemployment benefits (a State responsibility at that
time) and revenue deficits.
10
The voluntary arrangement worked reasonably well, although there were
occasions when the full support of all members of the voluntary agreement was not
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forthcoming. For example, in February 1924, the Commonwealth requested the States to
withhold their loan offerings until its own $39 million conversion loan at 6 per cent had
been dealt with. While Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania complied with this
request, New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia issued their own securities,
interest on which was not only 6 per cent but was also exempt from State income taxes.
11
Agreement was reached in July 1924, however, for the Commonwealth to issue a cash
loan for the States in Australia while the States continued to issue their own securities in
London. Again, the States kept off the domestic capital market between July and
December 1925 so as to allow the Commonwealth loans to be raised as a matter of
priority. New South Wales pulled out of the voluntary Loan Council after the Labor Party
won an election in July 1925 and J. T. (Jack) Lang became the Premier of that State. The
State rejoined the voluntary Loan Council after Labor lost office in December 1927. It
will be noted below that Lang returned as Premier of New South Wales in 1930 and
became involved in some of the most memorable clashes with the Loan Council in 1931
and 1932.
3.2. Rule-based Coordination: 1928-1950
The first major test for the Loan Council, formally established in 1927, came during the
Great Depression of 1930-31.  The economic downturn gathered pace in Australia earlier
than in most other countries. Export prices, national production and budgetary revenues
fell sharply in 1929-30, while unemployment, government expenditure on unemployment
benefits and budgetary deficits rose significantly. Advances by banks to Australian
governments increased nearly ten-fold between June 1929 and 31 December 1930, from
$11 million to $106 million.
12 New South Wales had the largest amount of debt of all
jurisdictions in Australia in 1931, nearly 70 per cent of which had been raised in London,
and which had an interest payment of $2,686,000 falling due on 1 January 1931.
In June 1930, the Loan Council reduced the 1930-31 loan program by 45 per cent
in comparison with the previous year and asked all governments to balance their budgets
in the following financial year. In the face of declining revenue and increasing
unemployment relief expenditure, all governments were asked to impose new taxes.
These measures were part of the prevailing orthodoxy, which favored balanced budgets,
high taxes, high interest rates and cuts in wages for increasing the level of economic
activity and reducing unemployment.
3.3 New South Wales Defaults in 1931 and 1932
In October 1930, the Labor Party won a sweeping victory in New South Wales on the
platform of lower interest rates and credit expansion. The new State Premier, J. T. Lang,
informed the Chairman of the Loan Council (who was also the Acting Commonwealth
Treasurer) in November 1930 that it was impossible for his government to balance the
State budget without additional taxation and that more time was needed to pass the
necessary legislation. Referring to similar budgetary difficulties being faced by some of
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the other States, particularly Victoria and South Australia, Lang urged the
Commonwealth to approach the various Australian banks, including the Commonwealth
Bank, to obtain a temporary accommodation for financing the difficult budgetary
situation.
13
After consulting with the other banks, the Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank
informed the Loan Council in December 1930 that the banks insisted on all governments
keeping their expenditure within the limits of their respective budgetary income. “Not
until Australia as a whole is prepared to accept this fundamental principle can the banks
see any hope of extricating Australia from her difficulties and eventual disaster,” he
wrote. He added, however, that the banks would be prepared to meet temporary
requirements of a government if they were furnished with an assurance that the assistance
provided by the banks could be practically liquidated by June 30, 1931.
The Commonwealth Bank’s reply in effect conveyed a stern warning to the
governments to rein in their public expenditure.  It has not been possible to find
documentary evidence of an assurance provided by the Commonwealth or New South
Wales government, but the fact that New South Wales was able to meet its interest
payment in London in January 1931 suggests that some accommodation must have been
provided and a likely default by that State avoided.
This was not, however, the end of financial difficulties for New South Wales. The
fact that the Australian currency had depreciated by 30 percent
14 by January 1931 further
aggravated the budgetary impact of the economic downturn as the real burden of interest
payments on foreign loans increased correspondingly. Expert opinion about the best
policy response by governments was sharply divided into three groups at the time: one
led by the Commonwealth Bank, a second led by the federal Treasurer E. G. Theodore
and the third represented by Lang. An impasse developed in February 1931 when the
Loan Council and the Premiers’ Conference considered three alternative proposals for
future policy direction. The proposal put forward by the Committee of Under-Treasurers
(including the Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board) favored deflationary
measures but was unacceptable to the Commonwealth government. An alternative
proposal supported by the Commonwealth Treasurer involved cuts in government
expenditure, expansion of credit and reduction in interest rates but was unacceptable to
the Commonwealth Bank. (It should be noted that in April 1930, Theodore had
introduced legislation for the establishment of a central bank, which would have made
unsecured loans to the government if needed, but the legislation was defeated in the
Senate.) The third proposal, favored by Lang, required conditional repudiation of
overseas debt and compulsory reduction of interest rates but was rejected by everyone
else, including the other State Premiers.
15
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New South Wales defaulted on the payment of interest on its overseas debt in
April 1931. The Commonwealth paid the interest on the following day on behalf of the
government of New South Wales and instituted High Court proceedings against the state
for violating the Financial Agreement. The Court proceedings were later dropped after
the State government reimbursed the Commonwealth, agreed to resume further payments
of interest and accepted the Loan Council’s decision that balanced budgets must be
achieved by June 1934. Lang’s action triggered a run on the State Savings Bank of New
South Wales, which was forced to close its doors and temporarily freeze deposits of $110
million. The political repercussions of Lang’s default were even more serious. The
Federal executive of the Labor Party expelled the New South Wales executive, which
caused some member of the New South Wales Labor Party to resign and form a new
Lang Labor Party.
16
Later in 1931, Lang returned to the Loan Council, requesting leave to borrow
additional money from the banks by means of Treasury bills as his deficit was expected
to be larger than previously anticipated. When the request was refused, New South Wales
defaulted again on overseas interest payments in January 1932. This time the
Commonwealth did not pay the interest for ten days. According to one account of the
events “there was a flight of capital to the other States and investment in new South
Wales came to a standstill, and the community existed in a state of fear, wondering
whether revolution would result.”
17 After finally paying the interest on behalf of New
South Wales, the Commonwealth government passed the Financial Agreements
(Commonwealth Liability) Act 1932, under which it accepted liability to bondholders for
payments due on State debts. It also passed the Financial Agreements Enforcement Acts
(Nos 1, 2, 3 and 4) 1932, which laid down a formal procedure for the Commonwealth to
obtain legal authority from the High Court to attach the revenue of a State if that State
had violated the Financial Agreement.
Lang challenged the constitutional validity of these Acts in the High Court and
was supported in this challenge by Victoria and Tasmania, who both did not support the
default by New South Wales but were opposed to the implied attack of the legislation on
State sovereignty. By a majority of four to two, the High Court upheld the validity of the
Commonwealth legislation under section 105A. Lang nevertheless opposed the execution
of the High Court judgment and ordered the State officials to ignore the Commonwealth
directive. The Governor of New South Wales requested Lang to withdraw his orders of
non-compliance to State officers. When Lang refused to withdraw his directive, the
Governor
18 withdrew Lang’s commission and dismissed him from the office of the
                                                                                                                                                                    
confidence, jeopardize the financial system and actually increase unemployment (see De Long, 1998, p.
75).
16 These developments in Labor Party were also linked with the reinstatement of Theodore as federal
Treasurer, who had resigned in July 1930 following allegations of corruption.  His reappointment followed
his vindication in a civil suit.
17 Maclaurin (1937).
18 The government of each State in Australia is headed by a Premier, who is the leader of the political party
with a majority in the lower  house of the state parliament. Each State also has a formal, unelected head of
State, called Governor, who represents the Crown and issues in the name of the Crown the commission for11
Premier of New South Wales on 13 May 1932. In the ensuing State election on 12 June
1932, the Labor Party was badly defeated by the coalition of the United Australia Party
and the Country Party. Thus came to an end an episode in the Australian federation’s
history that cemented the dominant position of the Commonwealth, which was able to
impose its decisions on dissenting members of the Loan Council.
This episode also overshadows Jack Lang’s considerable contributions to the
procedures of the Loan Council and to the policy debates for achieving economic
recovery after the Depression. It is worth noting that Lang was responsible for proposing
a number of the Loan Council rules in 1927. One of his proposals was that money raised
for temporary purposes should remain outside the control of the Loan Council, except for
the approval of interest rates. Similarly, he proposed that in the event that unanimity was
not achieved, loan raisings should be allocated among the States in proportion to their net
loan expenditure during the previous five years. Lang also proposed that by unanimous
approval of the Loan Council a State might borrow overseas and issue its own
securities.
19
Lang’s proposal that the interest rate be reduced to 3 per cent was based on the
view, widely shared at the time in the trade union movement and the Labor Party, that the
burden of sacrifice for supporting economic recovery must be shared by bondholders and
wage earners. Opposed in the initial stages, that idea eventually became the basis of the
Commonwealth Debt Conversion Agreement Act  1931, which authorized the
Commonwealth on behalf of the Loan Council to convert the existing debts of the
Commonwealth and the States into new stock by invitation to the bondholders. The new
stock carried interest, which had been reduced by up to 22.5 per cent from original rates.
According to a contemporary account:
While Mr. Lang’s stand was most unpopular at the time, it was
ofmaterial value in persuading the more conservative groups that
conversion was necessary…The conversion loan proved a
spectacular success… The threat of compulsion was forgotten, and
most people willingly turned in their bonds for conversion…The
internal debt at the time was [$1,014] million. Only 3 per cent of
the bondholders dissented…There was no flight of capital
following the Plan, as some had forecast. In fact, capital
…returned to Australia after the inauguration of the Plan, probably
because it laid the ghost of inflation.”
20
Equally importantly, Lang did not favor overspending or overborrowing in the
usual meaning of the terms. Instead, he was opposed to the Loan Council’s deflationary
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19 Mathews and Jay (1972, pp. 113-115).
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policies for dealing with the effects of the depression. Within the Labor Party, the Federal
Treasurer E. G. Theodore also shared Lang’s opposition to deflationary measures,
although Theodore did not approve of  Lang’s defaults on payments of interest on
overseas loans.
21
3.4 States' Reliance on Commonwealth Lending
The post-war boom in investment in Australia was reflected in private gross fixed capital
expenditure increasing by 30 per cent in 1949-50 over the previous year, 43 per cent in
1950-51 and 22 per cent in 1951-52. Public sector gross fixed capital expenditure
increased even more sharply, by 44 per cent 1949-50 and 1950-51 and 34 per cent in
1951-52. The States were planning to borrow on an increasing scale but found out during
this period that their demand for funds could not be met without additional loans from the
Commonwealth, which would gain in consequence greater control over their borrowing
programs.
The size of the borrowing program submitted by the States to the Loan Council in
1951 became embroiled in a bitter division among the members. The States rejected the
Commonwealth’s suggestion that the program was too large and should be reduced by 25
per cent. As no agreement could be reached the issue was put to a vote, which the
Commonwealth was able to win in spite of opposition from four States.
22 Although the
Loan Council approved a borrowing program of $454 million, only $148 million could be
raised through the public loan. The Commonwealth provided the remaining $306 million
in the form of a special loan to the States. When a similar disagreement arose between the
Commonwealth and the States at the 1952 meeting of the Loan Council, all States were
united in insisting on the approval of a borrowing program of $495 million, while the
Commonwealth supported a smaller program of $360 million. Again, however, as the
public loan could only raise $117 million, the Commonwealth provided a special loan of
$263 million and the States eventually had to accept total borrowing of $380 million for
1952-53. Special loans (and capital grants in later years) from the Commonwealth
became a permanent feature of the States’ Loan Council borrowing in the subsequent
years.
23 Constituting a significant proportion of the States’ borrowing programs, special
loans became a major source of Commonwealth control over State borrowings during the
1950s and 1960s.
3.5 Loan Council Constraints and the Commonwealth: The Overseas Loans Affair
As noted above, the Commonwealth government’s domination of the Loan Council was
attributable to both its unequal voting rights in the Council and its financial superiority in
comparison to the States. As demonstrated by the overseas loans affair of 1974-75, this
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did not mean, however, that the Commonwealth government could disregard the
constraints and rules of the Loan Council.
In 1974-1975, the government of Prime Minister E. G. (Gough) Whitlam was
blamed for failing to observe the rules of the Loan Council, and the overseas loans affair
became a contributing factor in Whitlam’s dismissal in November 1975. The overseas
loans affair started in December 1974, when the Commonwealth Minister for Minerals
and Energy, Mr. R. F. X. (Rex) Connor was authorized by the Executive Council to raise
large overseas (petro-dollar) loans of up to $4,000 million for what was described at the
time as temporary purposes. The authorization was given at a meeting of the Executive
Council that was attended by the Prime Minister, the Federal Treasurer, the Federal
Attorney-General and Mr Connor, but at which the Governor-General was not present.
Neither the Loan Council, the Parliament, nor the Federal Cabinet had been consulted or
notified about the loans. The matter became public as a result of a newspaper report in
May 1975. The manner of the authorization for the loans attracted strong public criticism
of the government for violating the Financial Agreement, under which all member
governments were obliged to seek Loan Council approval for the term and conditions of
loans, even those for temporary purposes. In any event, Mr. Connor was later reported to
have said that the loan monies were to be used to finance an energy crisis program over
several years. In the face of strong criticism by the State Premiers at the Loan Council,
the Commonwealth government revoked the state’s authority for overseas loans in May
1975. The Prime Minister dismissed the Federal Treasurer (Dr. Jim Cairns) in July 1975
for misleading the Parliament.  Connor resigned from the ministry in October 1975.
The overseas loans affair occurred at a time when the Labor government was
facing a hostile Senate, which had already blocked the passage of several bills that had
been passed by the House of Representatives. Until October 1975, the Leader of the
Opposition, J. M. (Malcolm) Fraser had maintained that the Opposition would not block
funding in the Senate “in the absence of extraordinary and reprehensible circumstances.”
After October 1975, Fraser cited the circumstances leading to Connor’s resignation as a
justification for refusing to pass the Commonwealth Budget in the Senate. The failure of
Mr. Whitlam to assure the passage of the Budget before funds ran out led the Governor-
General (Sir John Kerr) to dismiss Whitlam as Prime Minister on 11 November 1975 and
to install Fraser as the caretaker Prime Minister. The Labor Party was soundly defeated
by the Liberal-Country Party Coalition in the general election held in December 1975,
when Malcolm Fraser became the new Prime Minister.
3.6 Relaxation of Loan Council Controls
As noted above, the Financial Agreement did not provide for the coordination of
borrowings undertaken by local government authorities and semi-government authorities
of the States. In 1936, when it was recognized that the States could avoid Loan Council
discipline by setting up such authorities for borrowing on their behalf, a Gentlemen’s
Agreement was signed by the Commonwealth and the States, which required that14
borrowing programs of larger semi-government authorities be approved by the Loan
Council.
24
Borrowings by State and Local government authorities increased sharply between
1977-78 and 1983-84 and were responsible for the strong growth of State and local public
sector borrowings as a percentage of GDP (Table 1).  Progressive relaxation of the Loan
Council restrictions by the Commonwealth government during this period was the main
factor behind this growth. In response to the widely shared prospect of a resource-led
boom in Australia in the late 1970s, the Commonwealth accepted the States’ pleas for
higher public sector borrowings for financing large infrastructure projects in the energy
and mining sectors. At the 1978 meeting, the Loan Council approved new guidelines and
established a separate category for borrowing programs that could not be reasonably
accommodated within the normal resources available to the States or had special
significance for economic development or required large outlays within a short span of
time. In 1982, the Loan Council decided to exempt from its approval domestic
borrowings of State electricity authorities. A year later, this exemption was extended to
all other larger semi-government authorities.
Overseas borrowing for infrastructure projects was initially approved after a case
by case consideration by the Loan Council, but from 1980-81 onward the Loan Council
set indicative ceilings within which overseas borrowings did not require approval. From
July 1983, the States were virtually free to allocate their overseas borrowings between
their semi-government authorities, and overseas borrowings undertaken by such
authorities became merely a sub-component of the overall global total.
25
The States took full advantage of the new opportunities and borrowed heavily
during this period, within Australia and overseas, for infrastructure program.  Borrowing
by the public trading enterprises of the States (PTEs) increased from 0.8 per cent of GDP
in 1976-77 to 2.6 per cent in 1983-84. In the absence of a compensatory reduction in the
borrowings of the general government sector, public sector borrowings jumped from 1.3
per cent of GDP in 1976-77 to 3.1 per cent in 1983-84. In their ongoing struggle to by-
pass the Loan Council restrictions, the States also developed new ways of raising
revenues, which were not at the time covered by the Loan Council controls.
By 1983-84, the State public sector had borrowed more than $2.3 billion under
the infrastructure guidelines, more than 60 per cent of which was borrowed overseas. The
Loan Council was on the verge of losing control over semi-government authority
borrowings. In 1979-80, for example, the Loan Council had approved 95 per cent of the
States’ semi-government authority borrowings. By 1983-84, the corresponding figure had
fallen to 25 per cent. Whereas borrowings by these authorities in 1979-80 constituted 1.4
per cent of GDP, the corresponding figure had doubled in 1982-83 and was only slightly
lower than that (2.6%) in 1983-84. As the general government sector also borrowed
heavily in 1982-83 and 1983-84 to cover recession-driven budgetary deficits, total public
                                                       
24 Initially, semi-government authorities borrowing more than $200,000 in a financial year were covered by
the provisions of the Gentlemen’s Agreement but in subsequent years the threshold amount was adjusted
upward several times.
25 Commonwealth Budget Paper No. 7, 1984-85, p. 36.15
sector borrowing had increased to 8.3 per cent of GDP in 1983-84, the highest level in
post depression years.
3.7 The Global Borrowing Limits
It was clear by 1983-84 that the Gentlemen’s Agreement was no longer an effective
instrument for imposing Loan Council discipline on subnational borrowings. At its 1984
meeting, the Loan Council suspended the Gentlemen’s Agreement and adopted a new
global limit approach, for a one-year trial, for restoring the authority of the Loan Council.
The following year, a global limit approach was adopted on an ongoing basis and the
Gentlemen’s Agreement was terminated. The central feature of the new approach was
that the longstanding distinction between the borrowings of the semi-government
authorities and of the rest of the government was abandoned. Instead, the Loan Council
approved each year an aggregate amount, the global limit, for new money borrowings
(i.e., excluding loans for re-financing purposes) of each State and the Commonwealth,
within which the governments were free to allocate borrowed funds between their
respective authorities and the general government sector.
Table 1
Public Sector Borrowing in Australia
(percent of GDP)












1972-73 2.0 0.0 0.4 0.8 3.2
1973-74 1.3 1.0 0.4 0.6 3.3
1974-75 2.0 -0.1 0.4 0.6 3.0
1975-76 4.8 0.0 0.5 0.8 6.1
1976-77 3.1 0.3 0.5 0.8 4.7
1977-78 2.6 0.1 0.4 0.9 4.0
1978-79 3.5 1.2 0.4 1.2 6.3
1979-80 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.4 2.7
1980-81 1.8 -0.1 0.4 1.5 3.5
1981-82 0.3 0.5 0.3 2.3 3.5
1982-83 3.1 0.0 0.3 2.8 6.1
1983-84 4.4 0.7 0.5 2.6 8.3
1984-85 3.2 0.6 1.1 1.7 6.5
1985-86 2.3 0.3 0.8 1.6 5.0
1986-87 1.6 1.0 1.4 1.1 5.1
1987-88 -1.3 0.1 1.2 0.7 0.7
1088-89 -1.6 0.4 0.8 0.4 0.0
1989-90 -2.2 0.9 0.8 0.3 -0.4
1990-91 0.1 0.9 1.8 0.1 2.9
1991-92 2.5 0.0 2.9 0.1 5.5
1992-93 4.0 0.2 2.0 -0.4 5.9
1993-94 3.4 -0.3 1.1 -0.5 3.7
1994-95 2.9 -0.3 0.1 -0.4 2.3
      Source: Foster (1996).16
The undertaking given by each government to respect the new global limits
covered all semi-government and local authorities, companies and trusts that were
effectively controlled by governments. Borrowings by public financial institutions (such
as State Banks and insurance offices) were exempt from the global limit, except when
such borrowings were on-lent to, or used by, governments or authorities that were
themselves subject to the global limit. In addition to conventional domestic and overseas
loan raisings, deferred payments, trade credits, leasing arrangements of all kinds, except
operating leases (which were included from 1993-94) and installment purchase by
government departments, were progressively added to the list of borrowings covered by
the global limit.
Consistent with the Commonwealth government’s policy of fiscal restraint during
this period, funds approved by the Loan Council under the States’ global limit were
progressively reduced from 1984-85 onwards. The reductions made were 6.9 percent in
real terms in 1985-86, 15.4 percent in 1986-87, 19.5 per cent in 1987-88 and 22 percent
in 1989-90. By 1989-90, the States’ aggregate global limit had been reduced to less than
60 per cent of its 1984-85 level in nominal terms. In real terms the reduction was far
greater. Although actual borrowings by the States generally exceeded the approved
amounts (see Table 2), the global limit approach was successful, at least in the initial
years of its operation, in halting the growth of subnational borrowings. Indeed, total
borrowings of the State and local sector had been reduced to 1.1 per cent of GDP by
1989-90 from the earlier peak of 3.1 per cent in 1983-84 (Table 1).
3.8 Resistance to the Global Limit Approach
In 1988, Queensland refused to endorse the global limit set by the Commonwealth for
that State and refused to comply with the Loan Council requirement of furnishing
information of borrowings by its authorities. The Commonwealth forced Queensland to
comply, however, after threatening to deduct from that State’s financial assistance grants
any excess of borrowings by Queensland over the global limit of $793 million set by the
Loan Council for that year.
Mr (later Sir) Joh Bjelke-Petersen, who had been the Premier of Queensland since
1968, had been forced by the National Party caucus to resign in December 1987 and was
succeeded as Premier by M. J. (Mike) Ahern, a former minister of health. Mr Ahern was
the Premier and Treasurer of Queensland when the State government refused to endorse
the global limit.
The background to the Queensland episode of 1988 was partly economic and
partly political. As noted above, from 1985-86 onwards, the Commonwealth government
had imposed on the States a policy of unprecedented fiscal restraint. Net Commonwealth
payments to the States and the Northern Territory had been reduced in real terms by 0.5
percent in 1985-86, 1.1 percent in 1986-87, and 4.4 percent in 1987-88. At the 1988
Premiers’ Conference and Loan Council meeting, the Commonwealth proposed a further17
cut of 7.0 percent in real terms to these payments.
26 These cuts would reduce
Commonwealth net payments in 1989-90 to 6.8 percent of GDP, the lowest level since
1961-62. The States had unsuccessfully resisted the cuts at each Premiers’ Conference.
As noted above, the Loan Council had applied even greater cuts to the States’ borrowings
since the introduction in 1984-85 of the new global limit. At the 1988 meeting of the
Loan Council the Commonwealth had asked for a further reduction in global limit
borrowings of the order of 22 per cent in real terms.
27 For individual States, however, the
reductions were distributed unevenly, with the largest cut of 32 per cent proposed for
Queensland.
The Commonwealth’s logic apparently was that Queensland could afford such a
large reduction. Queensland had always prided itself for being a State with low levels of
borrowings and public debt. At the end of June 1988, Queensland was the only State in
Australia whose general government sector became a net lender, after wiping out a small
net debt during the previous year.  Regardless of its low borrowing requirement,
however, the State had been “entitled” to substantial amounts of borrowings under the
arrangements applied at the time for the distribution of aggregate global limit among the
States (see Table 3). The disproportionate cut in Queensland’s 1988-89 global limit
reflected the Commonwealth’s desire to move towards a need-based allocation of the
proposed cuts to be applied to the total borrowings.
The following political background might have also played a role in  Ahern’s
refusal to accept the Loan Council’s decision.  Ahern was attending his first Premiers’
Conference and Loan Council meeting in May 1988 as Premier and Treasurer of
Queensland, having replaced Bjelke-Petersen the previous December. Although Ahern
had been a minister in Queensland for some time, he was relatively new to these two
principal forums of intergovernmental negotiations. In the past, his predecessor had
successfully practiced the art of “Canberra bashing” to win popular support in his own
State. New to the game of political brinkmanship, Ahern perhaps got carried away by the
theatrical atmosphere of the public session of the meeting. As the next election in
Queensland was to be held within the following 18 months, he might also have been
seeking to project an image of a strong leader who refused to allow Canberra to override
the interests of Queensland.  In the end, his refusal amounted to little more than a
symbolic protest. The Commonwealth proceeded with the global limit approved by the
Loan Council and used the 1988-89 figure for approving Queensland’s global limit
borrowings in subsequent years without any amendments.  T. R. (Russell) Cooper
replaced Ahern as Premier of Queensland in September 1989, less than three months
before the following State election that was held on 2 December 1989. Mr Wayne Goss
became the next Premier of Queensland after the Labor Party won the election and
formed the new government in Queensland after a period of 21 years in opposition.
                                                       
26 Government of Victoria, Commonwealth-State Financial Relations in the 1980s, Victorian Treasury
Discussion Paper No. 1, Department of the Treasury, Melbourne, June 1990.
27 In the event, however, actual borrowings by the States in 1988-89 were $135 million below the approved
amount.18
Queensland’s episode focussed attention on at least one of the shortcomings of the
global limit approach—that global limits approved by the Loan Council for individual
jurisdictions were not related to their respective needs but were driven solely by
macroeconomic targets of the Commonwealth government. The changes introduced by
the Loan Council soon after the Queensland episode, including the replacement of the
global limit approach by a new system of Loan Council Allocations in 1994 (discussed
below), attempted to address this problem as well as the other shortcomings of the
previous approach.
The Loan Council decided in 1990 that the allocation of global borrowings to
individual jurisdictions would be moved progressively to equal per capita shares. The
Commonwealth also ceased to borrow on behalf of the States from 1989-90 onwards. The
Commonwealth remained responsible for the debt which it had issued on behalf of the
States in the past but the States now became responsible for financing and managing their
own debt. The new borrowing arrangements exposed the States and their central
borrowing authorities to financial scrutiny from credit rating agencies. Depending upon
their respective credit ratings, different States now faced different interest costs for their
borrowings (see Table 2), whereas previously all States were charged the same rate of
interest by the Commonwealth government.
Agreement was also reached in 1990 for the States to progressively redeem the
debt that the Commonwealth government had issued on their behalf so that by 2005-06
this debt would be fully taken over by the States. In 1992, it was agreed to amend the
Financial Agreement to give formal recognition to the new arrangements for State
borrowings. A new Financial Agreement was signed in 1994 and became operative from
1 July 1995.
Table 2
Credit Ratings of Australian States: 1989-1998
Date NSW VIC QLD WA SA TAS
May 1989 AAA








Source: Information supplied by Standard and Poor’s, May 1999.19
3.9 Retrospective Bailout of Victoria
At its May 1991 meeting, the Loan Council approved a basic global borrowing limit of
$3,750 million for all States. This figure represented zero nominal increase over the
previous year’s approved global limit but was a reduction of nearly $400 million on the
actual borrowings in 1990-91, which had exceeded the approved limit. Special temporary
additions of $818 million were added, however, to the 1991-92 basic global limit, of
which $300 million was for Victoria. Actual borrowings in 1991-92, however, far
exceeded these figures, with Victoria’s borrowings increasing from $1,137 million in
1990-91 to $ 2661 million in 1991-92.
Victoria’s budgetary position had deteriorated sharply from 1989-90 onwards due
to several adverse developments. First, in common with the other States, Victoria’s
revenues had been adversely affected by the stock market crash of October 1987 and the
recession of 1990-91. Additionally, however, Victoria had major problems of its own. A
number of private sector companies to whom Victorian Economic Development
Corporation (VEDC) had financial exposure by way of loans or share of equity had
performed poorly.  A merchant bank, Tricontinental Bank, which was a subsidiary of the
government-owned State Bank of Victoria, had also collapsed, leaving the Victorian
government with an exposure of $2.7 billion to fund its guarantee and eventually to the
sale of the State Bank of Victoria. The failure of a group of building societies, the Farrow
Group, had also added to the financial liabilities of the State government of Victoria. The
interest cost on Victoria’s debt had increased with the rise in interest rates in the late
1980s and in 1990 and 1991. In addition to a capital account deficit, Victoria’s current
revenue account had also turned into a deficit in 1989-90.
State Treasurer R. A. Jolly resigned in April 1990, followed by Premier John
Cain, who resigned in August 1990 and was replaced by Joan Kirner as the new Labor
Premier. Between 1989-90 and 1991-92, the State government borrowed heavily from its
non-budget sector financial entity, the Victorian Development Fund (VDF). The Loan
Council’s approval had not been obtained for these borrowings, presumably because the
State regarded these as short-term advances. In May 1992, a few weeks before the end of
the financial year on 30 June, Victoria refinanced these advances as medium term loans
from Victorian Public Authorities Finance Agency (VicFin). However, this refinancing
put Victoria in breach of the Loan Council conditions, as the medium-term borrowings
fell within the definition of global limit borrowing. However, as compliance with these
conditions was voluntary, there was no formal action required or taken by the Loan
Council.
Financial mismanagement by the Labor governments of Cain and Kirner became
a key issue in the State election that was held in October 1992. The Liberal-National
Party Coalition ran its election campaign by concentrating on the theme of labelling
Labor as the “Guilty Party.” The Labor Party was soundly defeated in the election and
Jeff Kennett replaced Kirner as Premier of Victoria.20
At the December 1992 meeting, the Loan Council retrospectively approved
additional borrowings totalling $2,981.5 million for Victoria in respect of its excess
borrowings in 1991-92 and 1992-93. The Loan Council approved further special
additions for Victoria of $700 million in March 1993.
Occurring retrospectively after the change of government in Victoria, these
approvals effectively set the record straight and cleared the deck for the new State
government’s dealings with the Loan Council. The Victorian episode also led the Loan
Council to strengthen its reporting requirements and to shift its focus to prospective
budgetary situation and strategy of each jurisdiction.
3.10  The End of the Global Limit Approach
At its meeting on 7 December 1992, the Loan Council admitted that the global limit
arrangement of the previous nine years had “become less effective over time and by the
end of 1992 [was] at the point of breakdown.”
28 It was also recognised that neither the
aggregate global limit nor its allocation was directly related to a jurisdiction’s fiscal
circumstances. From 1 July 1993, global borrowing limits were replaced by the new Loan
Council Allocations (LCAs). The new approach was designed to signal a change in the
philosophy of the Loan Council from insisting on a rigid regime of compliance to one
based on a framework that was both credible and transparent. Together with the Loan
Council’s scrutiny, market exposure of State finances is expected to provide greater fiscal
discipline.
Under the new arrangement, each jurisdiction is required to nominate a Loan
Council allocation, which is anchored in its own estimated budget balance for the
forthcoming year and its strategy to achieve a balance if the budget is in deficit. If the
sum total of the nominated LCAs is inconsistent with the Commonwealth government’s
macroeconomic policy objectives, appropriate adjustments are negotiated with the States.
Tolerance limits are agreed upon with the jurisdictions to allow flexibility in the event
that economic forecasts are not realized. Each jurisdiction is obliged to report to the Loan
Council on an annual and quarterly basis regarding its budgetary situation, and uniform
and comprehensive reporting arrangements have been established for such reporting. The
LCAs are based on estimated budget balance plus certain memorandum items, which are
akin to borrowing even though they might not be strictly classified as such.
29
The new Loan Council Allocations system is intended to:
•  Facilitate financial market scrutiny of public sector finances via better
reporting and so make jurisdictions more accountable to markets;
                                                       
28  Australian Loan Council,  Future Arrangements for Loan Council Monitoring and Reporting, Loan
Council 5 July 1993, p. 1.
29 These items include the impact of operating leases, recourse asset sales, private sector involvement in
public sector infrastructure projects, public sector superannuation funds, local government, statutory
marketing authorities, and central borrowing authorities.21
•  Enhance the role of the Loan Council as a forum for coordinating public
sector borrowings in the light of the national fiscal situation and the fiscal
policy imperatives confronting individual governments;
•  Promote greater public and financial market understanding of budgetary
processes; and
•  Provide the basis for States’ assuming greater freedom and responsibility in
determining their financing requirements consistent with their fiscal and debt
position and overall macroeconomic constraints.
30
4.  Summary and Conclusions
It is possible to interpret the operations of the Australian Loan Council in different ways.
For example, the nature of Australia’s borrowing controls may be described, as Ter-
Minassian and Craig have done, as “cooperative controls.”
31 On the other hand, the
foregoing discussion in this paper reveals that the Loan Council’s decisions concerning
subnational borrowings have been virtually dictated by the Commonwealth government,
which has exercised its dominant position in Australia’s revenue raising system to
override any opposition by the States.
The High Court of Australia has interpreted the Constitutional restrictions (section
90 in particular) to virtually exclude the States from the field of taxation on the sales or
consumption of goods.
32  Since 1942, when the Commonwealth gained a monopoly over
income taxation in Australia, the States have been extremely constrained in respect of
their revenue raising powers.
33 The combined effect of these decisions is that the States
collect less than 17 per cent of national taxation revenue while they are responsible for
nearly one-half of public sector outlays. Thus, the States have become critically and
permanently dependent on financial assistance from the Commonwealth. This financial
assistance comes in a variety of ways, including general revenue grants, general purpose
capital grants and advances, and specific purpose grants and advances. Although some
formula-based funding arrangements have always existed to reduce the degree of
arbitrariness, in the ultimate analysis virtually all Commonwealth assistance is
susceptible to changes in Commonwealth policy.
The episode of Queensland’s resistance to global limits illustrates this aspect of
the States’ fiscal vulnerability. In that episode, the Commonwealth government was able
to impose its decision on Queensland solely because of the threat that, if necessary, it
could reduce that State’s general revenue grants, in spite of the fact that those grants were
formula-based payments and were widely regarded as totally unencumbered by any
discretionary conditions. Indeed, the following candid admission made by P. J. Keating
(who was Federal Treasurer between 1983-1990 and Prime Minister from 1991-1996)
sums up the controlling position of the Commonwealth extremely well:
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31 Minassian and Craig (1997, pp. 158-159).
32 See Grewal (1998).
33 See Mathews and Grewal (1997) for a detailed discussion and references on this topic.22
The national perspective dominates Australian political life
because the national government dominates revenue raising, and
only because the national government dominates revenue raising.
34
The establishment of the Loan Council in the 1920s provided a rule-based
mechanism for the coordination of public loans at a time when the market-based
competitive system of public borrowing had proved to be counterproductive. As noted
above, from 1951 onwards the Commonwealth government became more influential in
the determinations of the Loan Council, thanks to its ability to provide special loans to
the States.  Commonwealth support, however, proved to be a double-edged sword for the
States. On the one hand, it enabled them to borrow on a larger scale than they could have
borrowed on their own at reasonable rates of interest. On the other hand, the special loans
also made it possible for the Commonwealth to dominate the Loan Council and, through
it, national policy on capital outlays and public investment.
The Commonwealth government lost its way, however, towards the end of the
1970s, when it relaxed Loan Council controls on borrowings for infrastructure programs,
which resulted in a blow-out of subnational borrowings in the 1980s. In the mid-1980s,
concerns over Australia’s current account deficit and foreign debt led the Commonwealth
into enforcing a strategy of severe fiscal contraction, which culminated in the recession of
1990-91. During this period, the Loan Council again served as an important vehicle for
enforcing Commonwealth policy on the States.
Throughout this period, however, the Loan Council’s approach targeted public
borrowing by the States indiscriminately, with little attention to the different needs of
individual States. After the financial deregulation introduced in Australia during the mid-
1980s, the Loan Council’s discipline over the States became increasingly ineffective. The
Council was generally a step behind the States and was often engaged in closing
loopholes that had been exploited by some of the States through new and innovative
schemes for avoiding accountability.
Although the Loan Council did not bail out the States explicitly, it did contribute
to softening their budget constraints implicitly through special additions to the borrowing
programs and global limits from time to time. Supplementations of this kind did not,
however, always distort the States’ fiscal choices.  When the supplementations were
provided ex post, as in the case of the defaults by New South Wales in the 1930s and the
retrospective bailout of Victoria in 1992, they did not become a part of the States’
expectations and are unlikely to have distorted their decisions. But whenever the
supplementations were provided  ex ante, as was the case under the borrowing
arrangements for infrastructure projects, or under the global limit approach, they distorted
the incentives facing the States and resulted in sharp increases in the level of borrowings.
Following this reasoning, the arrangements of the Loan Council can be considered to
have been successful and non-distorting, except for the period between 1978-89 and
1992-93.
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It is clear from the above discussion that the Commonwealth government’s
domination of Australia’s public finances is extremely important in understanding the
Loan Council’s role in the coordination of subnational borrowings. It has been argued
above that the Commonwealth government was able to use the Loan Council as an
instrument of its own policies. Changes in the operations and procedures of the Loan
Council over the years followed closely the dictates of Commonwealth policy. The
success or failure of the Loan Council indeed reflected the success or failure of the
Commonwealth policy in a particular period.
Another consequence of the Loan Council arrangements, not often recognized,
was that the smaller States benefited from the formula based allocations of the Loan
Council. These allocations provided implicit financial equalization that undoubtedly
helped the less populous States, which otherwise would not have been able to raise the
same amount of capital resources in the market. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the
present Loan Council arrangements may well contribute to widening economic disparities
between the States by removing this form of financial equalization and by increasing the
exposure of the States’ capital programs to market forces.24
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